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SPACE GOVERNANCE AND NEW ENTRANTS TO THE SPACE
SECTOR
Dr. Cassandra Steer*
The same big players determine space law and space politics are determined as terrestrial geopolitics, and therefore in asking how to govern space,
we have to take the current realities of international relations and international
law into account. At the beginning of the space race, which was at the height
of the Cold War, the two superpowers were the key influential players in developing the first instruments of space governance, namely the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty (OST),1 and three of the four other core space treaties.2 To a
lesser degree, European powers and other smaller influential States, such as
Canada, were also involved in the treaty negotiations, in forming relevant UN
General Assembly resolutions, and in the decision-making within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). But typically, for the
development of any new international legal or governance regime, the smaller
players are left on the periphery to accept the new order that is put in place by
the greater powers. This new order that they accept is also often to their detriment. In many ways it is very difficult for new entrants into the space sector
to wield any great influence on developing norms, or on the sector as a
whole—at least, this is the case for States. Today’s space race is equal parts
commercial and political, and commercial players have a unique ability to
disrupt the status quo. However, my comments here are limited to States as
new entrants.
How are new entrants interacting with the international space law regime
inherited from the Cold War, and what kinds of new governance structures
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might we need to deal with the increasing number and kinds of participants
emerging in the space sector? I take a critical perspective, drawing on feminist
legal theory and Third World Perspectives on International Law (TWAIL) to
pose further questions: Who is exercising power over the development of new
legal and governance norms in space and who is excluded from this? I argue
that, because we are all so dependent on space for our contemporary existence,
twenty-first century space governance needs to take into account more than
solely the interests of just the biggest players.
Not only are there more nations active in space, but there are more and
more activities being conducted in space, including commercial and scientific.
This might include universities facilitating students being able to learn how to
design and launch very small satellites into a very low Earth orbit. It might
also include big commercial players such as SpaceX and OneWeb, who are
beginning to launch hundreds of satellites as part of “constellations” to provide Internet access all over the world.3 And it also includes military competition and contestation. Space has become more accessible and with this
comes more challenges in terms of space traffic management, increase in debris and risk of collision, allocation of the radio signals necessary for satellites
to transmit their signals and the risk of interference, light pollution caused by
satellite constellations in lower orbit, environmental damage from launches
and re-entries, and unequal access for developing nations. These concerns are
growing in recent times, but the 1967 OST already foresaw what competition
could lead to in space, which is why Article I of the OST states that the exploration and use of outer space:
[S]hall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind . . . .
Outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and
in accordance with international law.
Furthermore, under Article VI of the OST, States are responsible for authorizing and continually supervising all space activities that take place under
their jurisdiction, whether they are government or commercial activities. And
States are responsible for damages caused by those space activities under Articles VI and VII of the OST and under the Liability Convention.4 It is, therefore, up to States to regulate space activities under their domestic law, but at
3
Mike Wall, SpaceX’s Starlink Constellation Could Swell by 30,000 More Satellites,
SPACE.COM (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.space.com/spacex-30000-more-starlink-satellite
s.html; see also Our Mission, ONEWEB (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.oneweb.world/our-m
ission.
4
Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, supra
note 2.

2020]

WHO HAS THE POWER?

753

the same time, these are international global problems, and we need to come
up with international legal and governance solutions as well. We need to think
about our space environment the way that we think about our oceans and about
natural world heritage areas, as a global commons. Space is part of our natural
environment, upon which we’re very dependent. We cannot count on individual States, who operate according to their own interests, to regulate in the
global interest.
Given this global interest and participation in space, a broad definition
should be given to what we mean by “new entrant.” Today there are only
fourteen space-faring nations—that is, States that have independent launch
capability from their own territory.5 New Zealand was a new addition in 2019,
and in 2020 Australia will also join this list.6 However, there are at least 72
countries which have space programs, and around 100 States own satellites.7
There are approximately 2,000 operational satellites today, of which the
United States owns nearly half, which is more than the combined total of the
next top ten States.8 Almost all States receive some kind of satellite-based
services, such as television broadcasting, phone and internet communications,
navigation, precision timing for services such as banking, traffic, medical
equipment, farming, weather and climate predictions, and much more. It may
not be that all of these States can be considered “new entrants” since many of
them are more likely consumers of the space economy rather than active participants. But as more States are participating in and impacting upon the space
sector, a broad definition should include all stakeholders in order to respond
to the needs of space governance in the twenty-first century.
The notion of “new entrant” States usually brings to mind countries such
as Israel9 and India10 who have only taken a few years to develop a successful
space program—and in the case of India, even to test an anti-satellite weapon
5
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in 2019, much to the chagrin of the current big players.11 New entrants may
be seen as disrupting the political status quo, or challenging the legal grey
areas in space law. However, some new entrants, such as Australia, are less
disruptive yet highly innovative. The Australian Space Agency (ASA) was
created in 2018 and only opened its physical headquarters on February 19,
2020,12 with a mandate to support the growth of Australia’s space industry.13
There is no national civil space program, rather the government is entirely
focused on pouring money and resources into supporting Australian commercial space entities. This is quite a different scenario from the U.S., where commercial entities have historically had to compete with, or seek contracts
through, NASA’s national space program.
Additionally, some new entrants who are not typically challengers to the
international legal or political order have been highly disruptive with small
actions. In 2017, Luxembourg passed a law stating that it will provide licenses
to companies registered in Luxembourg to extract and possess resources in
outer space14—a law which appears to be in breach of the prohibition of appropriation under Article II of the OST, and yet, because it has not been legally
challenged, in fact invites companies from around the world to register in
Luxembourg and boost that small country’s economy. The U.S. passed a similar law in 2015,15 and both countries argue they are simply fulfilling their
obligation under Article VI of the OST to “authorize and supervise” space
activities.16 However, there is still debate as to whether both States’ legislation
is in breach of the OST. In any case Luxembourg’s legislation goes further
than the U.S.’s act, and the fact that such a small player may have impacted
future interpretation of the OST took many by surprise.
Space security expert Joan Johnson-Freese describes the tensions surrounding space governance as a geo-strategic contest in space, particularly
11
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based on the competition between great powers.17 But this is not only due to
traditional counter-weights such as Russia or China; it is the rapid rise of multiple new entrants which may be causing real challenges to traditional geostrategic positioning, and which forces us to think of new ways to resolve such
issues.
A noted above, the international space legal framework we have today is
inherited from the height of the Cold War and was very much determined by
the political climate of the time. But it must be remembered that this is always
the case—and perhaps especially for international law. Political climates determine both the law-making processes and the normative content of the law.
Law presents itself as neutral, objective, rational, and universally applicable. But as Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright wrote
in their seminal 1991 article “Feminist Perspectives on International Law”:
Western theories about the law say that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic system, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and
is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and objectivity.18
However, as the authors point out, we all know that some are more equal
than others in the eyes of the law. And it is clear that laws are always the result
of the political climate at a given time. For example, immigration laws in the
U.S. changed dramatically in 2001, post-911, and they have changed again
controversially in the last four years due directly to a specific political climate.
Labor laws and equal opportunity laws were far weaker fifty years ago than
they are today. Laws on slavery determined that black human beings were a
commodity, with no rights, and could lawfully be bought and sold. Up until
the 1960s, female human beings were considered to be children under the law.
If we got married, we had to give up our jobs, couldn’t have bank accounts,
and couldn’t sign contracts or own real estate. Law is ultimately a political
event, it’s always the product of its time, and it’s always the product of those
who have the power to determine the law. Law is never neutral, rather it’s
always an expression of that power, and designed to maintain a certain status
quo.
Feminist legal methodologies are applied to unveil power, by asking two
questions: who has power and who lacks it. In many ways, as a critical legal
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tool, feminist methodologies are similar to TWAIL, which critique the ways
in which international law has always been developed by the Western powers
to maintain their power in the world order, often to the direct detriment of
developing nations.19 An institution that both methodologies critique is the
UN system, that was established post-World War II to maintain the world order at that time, and in particular the five permanent members of the Security
Council and their exclusive veto power. Despite cries for reform of the UN
for many years now, any formal or procedural changes would require those
five permanent members to agree to those changes, and not to exercise their
veto, however it is extremely unlikely that all five of them would willingly
give up their positions of power.
If we apply a critical lens to international space law, we must ask who
holds the power and who lacks it? As I’ve already noted, space politics are the
same as terrestrial politics, in the sense that the biggest players are determining space governance: the U.S. first, the EU second, with a counterweight
from China and Russia. But this status quo is starting to be an albatross around
the neck of the very nations wishing to remain ahead in the commercial and
political space race, and there are more opportunities for positive disruption
as the number (and type) of entrants into the space sector continues to increase.
One example of the status quo is the fact that COPUOS has appeared deadlocked for many years by the consensus process of decision-making. It was
under the auspices of COPUOS that the five core space treaties were negotiated and signed, and consensus decision-making made sense at the time, when
there were fewer members. Over time, with more members, it has become
more difficult to come to consensus on any issues, hence the lack of any new
space treaties since the 1970s. Often commentators will point to this as evidence that there is no international appetite for new treaties, however this represents only the view of certain influential players, namely the U.S. and its
tethered allies: countries like Australia, Canada, much of the EU and the UK,
all of whom are tethered for political and security reasons. When the U.S.
takes a position, tethered allies will follow suit. For example, a vast majority
of countries express a concern about the weaponization of outer space through
annual UN General Assembly resolutions, and recently a UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
was set up to discuss the possibility of a new treaty. 20 Many nations have also
19
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made unilateral statements promising a No First Placement of weapons in
outer space, and China and Russia have presented joint proposals for a Treaty
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,21 but the U.S.
continues to refuse to support such initiatives, and its tethered allies follow
suit. This power structure played out explicitly at the recent GGE meeting in
2019. There is no public documentation from that meeting yet available, but I
attended an event on space security in which delegates from the U.S. Department of State very openly, proudly stated that they had managed to blockade
any further discussion on a possible treaty.
Similarly, the attempt to negotiate a non-binding International Code of
Conduct (ICoC) to agree on certain standards of responsible conduct in outer
space has suffered from these power constructs. Originally an EU initiative,
articles of the instrument dealt with mitigating or minimizing space debris,
sharing of information and more transparency about who is doing what in
space, and other commitments leading to a more secure and stable environment. From a TWAIL perspective, there was a positive influence on the part
of developing nations, who critiqued the early process as being determined by
an EU agenda. Between 2008 and 2014, the EU opened up that process and
held round tables in various regions around the world to try and respond to
their critique. By 2015 it seemed the ICoC had gained sufficient support, a
meeting was hosted by the UN to try and reach agreement on the document.
However, a majority of that meeting was spent discussing critiques of the process, by nations still unhappy that once again, international governance was
to be determined by a few big players, ignoring the interests of so many other
stakeholders.22 In a glaring example of this very power structure, the U.S.
shifted its earlier position of supporting the ICoC, to blocking it based on the
objection that there the right to use force in self-defense in space was not satisfactorily codified. As any international lawyer knows, a non-binding instrument can never change anything about the right to use force in self-defense,
which is guaranteed both by customary international law and by Article 51 of
the UN Charter. That right also applies in space, not only because it is a customary right under international law, but also because the OST states explicitly in Article III that any activity in space must be carried out in accordance
with international law, “including the Charter of the United Nations.”23 The
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most influential player blockaded this international space governance initiative for its own political reasons, and its tethered allies once again followed
suit.
When we ask the question who is excluded by these power structures in
international space law, it is clear that in general, it is the new entrants as well
as developing nations who may stand to benefit from the space economy and
from long term sustainability of the space environment, even if they are not
active participants. Even those new entrants which are tethered allies to the
U.S., and which therefore benefit from U.S. protection, are not able to exercise
any power over the international law-making and governance processes, due
to their dependence on the U.S.
In 1996, a large coalition of developing nations succeeded in having a resolution passed by the UN General Assembly, which is known as the “Space
Benefits Declaration.” Its full title describes its intent: The Declaration on
International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the
Needs of Developing Countries refers to the articles of the OST which guarantee right of access to and benefit from space for all nations, and calls upon
States more active in space to fulfill their obligations towards others less so.
Its existence is a positive sign, however it has little normative weight as a
General Assembly resolution and has had arguably little to no impact.
Put simply, a critical perspective tells us that twenty-first century space
governance needs to take into account more than the interests of the biggest
players, especially in the face of space debris, regulating access to commercially valuable orbital slots, safety for human space-flight, and reigning in or
preventing weaponization. The question is, how? Taking a “stakeholder” approach to governance may help, as it allows, in theory, at least, for all stakeholders to have some kind of voice in the creation and content of the rules that
govern their behavior and the behavior of other stakeholders.
New entrants need to be creating strong political blocs, and perhaps even
moving forward to new agreements without the bigger players, if those bigger
players are blockading or refusing to take part. If there are enough coalitions
with agreements on responsible conduct and what this requires, eventually the
bigger players will have to take part in order to participate in this increasing
space economy.
We also need to look more at non-binding government initiatives. For instance, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that were agreed upon through
an Inter-Agency committee, bringing together real experts from national
space agencies, has been a relatively successful document that’s been integrated into national regulations. More recently non-governmental, non-binding initiatives have started to appear, for example the Space Safety Coalition,
consisting of over twenty organizations, whose voices as stakeholders have a
potential to impact international safety standards where these are lacking in
both international and domestic space law.
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Also, we need to come up with solutions that build upon the successes of
space governance to date, such as the inclusion of commercial entities in the
decision-making structure of the International Telecommunications Union,
which determines the allocation of frequencies needed by satellites for various
purposes. We also need to see the OST itself as a success. I am in disagreement with anyone who argues the need to renegotiate or update the OST. It is
a framework treaty, which lays out general principles such as non-appropriation, the prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons, the principle of
peaceful purposes, and the guarantee of access to and use of space for all. To
date, all of these principles have been adhered to. The issues we face this century require new and more detailed agreements, but that is not the task of a
framework treaty.
Finally, I am moved by the Botswanan notion of Ubuntu, which is an expression of justice, humanity, and compassion.24 Ubuntu is used to test any
decision or law on the moral basis that an action is right in so far as it promotes
a shared identity: “I am because we are, we are because I am.” This supersedes
any power play, and takes into account the interests of all stakeholders, including intergenerational ones: can future generations benefit if we behave in
this way or make this rule, or are we impeding them?

24

NYOKO MUVANGUA & DRUCILLA CORNELL, UBUNTU AND THE LAW: AFRICAN IDEALS
POSTAPARTHEID JURISPRUDENCE (2012); see generally Karen Smith, Contrived
Boundaries, Kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African View of “The International”, in
THINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DIFFERENTLY (Arlene B. Tickner & David L. Blaney
eds., 2013), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/.
AND

